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Abstract
In the context of a general equilibrium model with overlapping generations and
intergenerational altruism we show that, ceteris paribus, a decrease in taxes on inter
vivos donations and bequests brings about an increase in real estate prices. This
result has relevant policy implications. We test the predictions of our theory exploiting
the abolition of bequest and donation taxation that took place in Italy in 2001. We
implement this test by using an original and unique dataset on sales, donations and real
estate prices for 13 italian cities between 1993 and 2004. Our estimates suggest that,
controlling for other explanatory variables, the 2001 abolition of taxation on bequests
and donations contributed substantially to the appreciation of Italian residential real
estate.
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This paper investigates the e⁄ect of the tax treatment of bequests and inter vivos donations
on the price of long-lasting assets in general and real estate in particular. This is not just
an academic question but it has immediate policy relevance in the current European and
American debate. Italy controversially abolished taxation on bequests and donations in
2001. In the US, after President Bush opted for its complete abolition starting from 2010,
President Obama is planning to reintroduce it in 2011. Since real estate prices played a
central role in several ￿nancial crises (including the last one), we should carefully consider
all their determinants, including bequest and inter vivos donations taxation as this paper
suggests.
First, we present a stylized overlapping generations model to illustrate the main mech-
anism and provide the intuition for why the tax treatment of bequests and inter vivos
donations (for brevity: bequest tax from now on) can be an important determinant of
the price dynamics of long-lived assets in general, and real estate in particular. Then,
constructing an original dataset assembling a variety of sources on real estate prices, sales
and donations for the 13 largest Italian cities in the period 1993-2004, we provide empirical
evidence in support of our view. We use our dataset to exploit the extraordinary opportu-
nity o⁄ered by Italy to investigate and test the role of bequest taxation as a determinant
of asset pricing.1
Bequest taxation in Italy has been in place at non negligible rates until the second half
of 2001 and was abolished thereafter. Although the total revenue from this tax is relatively
small in all OECD countries and the historical trend is toward its abolition (Bertocchi
[4]), the bequest tax in Italy was pretty steep. Given that the threshold of exemption was,
roughly, 125K euro (per total estate) until 1999 and 175K euro (per recipient) in 2000,
almost any transfer involving residential real estate was a⁄ected by the tax.2 The tax rate
on bequest and donations had a progressive structure and ranged from 3% to 27% of the
asset value - depending on its size and the presence of family relations between the donor
1Constantinides et al [8] point out the potentially important role of bequest for asset pricing in the
context of the equity premium puzzle. Bernheim et al. [3] highlight how agents react to tax incentives
in the timing of interegenerational transfers. Recently, intergenerational transfers and estate taxation are
receiving renewed (theoretical) attention as shown in Kopczuk [18] and Farhi and Werning [9], [10].
2Unfortunately, we are unable to provide an exact measure of how many donations and bequests involv-
ing residential real estate were below the threshold of exemption, because of lack of disaggregated micro
data. There is nonetheless a general consensus that the very vast majority of donations and bequests were
subject to the tax, given the average price of apartments in major italian cities.
1and the receiver of the donation.3
The main contribution of this paper is to link real estate price appreciation to the
abolition of bequest and inter vivos donation taxation via the sharp increase in the number
of donations observed starting from 2001. Figure 1 o⁄ers descriptive evidence in support
of our claim: we observe that real estate appreciation in Italy ￿rst moved into positive
territory in 1999, but it received an additional signi￿cant boost starting from 2001 (darker
area in Figure 1), when the number of real estate donations increased by more than 100%.
This latter increase, and not the entire period in which real estate appreciated, is what
we seek to explain in this paper.
There are three elements suggesting that bequest taxation was particularly important
in the context of the Italian residential housing market. First, housing is by far the
predominant asset through which inter-generational transfers are carried out. Second, the
ratio of real estate donations over real estate market transactions averaged more than
50% across the 13 major Italian cities in 2004 (in Palermo, Catania, and Cagliari the
number of donations was actually larger than market transactions). It is then by all means
reasonable to argue that housing donations may have an impact on house prices. Finally,
at the national and major cities levels, the number of inter vivos donations in residential
real estate showed an astonishing increase of more than 100% between 2000 and 2001 as a
consequence of the abolition of bequest taxation (Figure 2). If we restrict our attention to
the 13 major Italian cities, the number of housing units that were donated jumped from
below 15,000 in 2000 to almost 40,000 in 2002. These dynamics are a common feature in
all Italian cities (Figure 3) and the drastic change in economic behavior seems to indicate
that the e⁄ect of the policy change was far from negligible. This observation ￿nds support
in Jappelli et al [17]: using the Bank of Italy Survey of Household Income and Wealth
(SHIW), they also document a statistically signi￿cant increase in the size of the estate
being transferred, especially for the richer, due to the abolition of bequest taxation.
The surge in real estate prices has been a global phenomenon until 2007. Between 1997
and 2003 real estate prices in di⁄erent economies - Australia, France, Ireland, Netherlands,
Spain and the United Kingdom - have risen by more than 70 percent while Italy and the US
have witnessed increase in excess of 30%.4 By and large, it is not di¢ cult to rationalize this
empirical evidence if one considers that, during this period, basically all these countries
experienced sustained economic growth, population growth and low real interest rates.
3In the absence of family relations, the relevant tax rate was even higher. See Table 1 in the Appendix
and Jappelli et al. [17] for additional details.
4IMF, World Economic Outlook, September 2004.
2In this group of economies Italy stands as a noticeable exception: although it shared
with other countries the reduction of real interest rates due to the euro-zone creation,
it experienced very low economic growth and demographic stagnation. Nevertheless, it
displayed substantial real estate appreciation. We view this di⁄erence as an additional
motivation for our enquiry on the speci￿c role of bequest taxation in relation with real
estate prices.
There are two main results in our theoretical analysis. First, we prove that the price of
housing increases as the tax rate on bequests decreases. Second, we show that a decrease
in the tax rate on bequests increases the amount of real estate donations. The intuition
behind our results can be conveyed by two distinct reasonings. The ￿rst reasoning focuses
on the wealth e⁄ect connected with a change in bequest and inter vivos donation tax.
When bequest taxation is decreased/abolished, the old increase the optimal amount of
inter-generational transfers to the young. This reallocation of resources from the old to
the young has a positive wealth e⁄ect on the segment of demand (the youth) that values
real estate the most, not only because, as any other asset, it can be resold but also
because it provides housing services whose utility is proportional to their lifespan. Thus,
the optimal reallocation of resources fostered by a fall in bequest taxation that makes
suppliers (old) poorer and demanders (young) relatively richer increases equilibrium real
estate prices.
The second intuition is based on a ￿no arbitrage￿reasoning. As the end of his life
approaches, an agent has to decide on how to use his assets and housing stock. He can
either leave this stock to his o⁄springs because of an ￿altruistic￿motive or he can sell it
on the market and receive the market price. In the ￿rst case, he will bene￿t from the
indirect utility coming from his o⁄springs satisfaction, net of any tax that this transfer
may be subject to. In the second case, he will have a stock of wealth that he can use
as he likes, including inter-generational money transfers, net of taxation. If the market
equilibrium is characterized by the coexistence of donations and resales of houses, it must
be the case that the representative agent is indi⁄erent, at the margin, between donating
a unit of housing to his o⁄springs or reselling it in the market for the market price.
When taxes on bequest and donation are abolished, two e⁄ects take place. The ￿rst
e⁄ect is a direct one: the marginal bene￿t of donating increases and so agents adjust
their optimal behavior to increase the amount of donations. The second e⁄ect is a general
equilibrium one related to the no-arbitrage condition: as people donate more of their
assets and housing stock, the market price of residential real estate must increase until a
new equilibrium price is reached. At the new price the indi⁄erence, in utility terms, for
3the representative agent between resale and donation is restored: the new equilibrium is
therefore characterized by a larger number of donations and higher market prices of real
estate (and any other long lived asset used to make inter-generational transfers).
Our theoretical perspective is then complemented, in the second part of the paper, with
an empirical investigation on the role of bequest and donation taxation. We highlight how
its abolition contributed to the Italian real estate price appreciation taking place from
2001, while we also account for its dynamics before 2001. Using an original and unique
dataset compiled assembling from a variety of sources data on real estate prices, sales and
donations for the 13 largest Italian cities in the period 1993-2004, we ￿nd support for
our main theoretical predictions: the abolition of taxation on bequests and donations had
a positive and sizeable e⁄ect on real estate prices, which is statistically signi￿cant and
robust to a series of additional tests. Given the characteristics of the exogenous (to real
estate prices) policy change that we consider, this is, to the best of our knowledge, the
￿rst paper to provide such evidence.
We view our empirical result to bear important policy implications as the abolition
of bequest taxation was primarily intended to bene￿t young generations who might ￿nd
it di¢ cult to buy houses at current market prices. Our analysis implies that, taking
into account previously neglected general equilibrium e⁄ects, the Italian tax reform might
actually have hurt the poorest among the young by bringing about an increase in the
purchasing cost of houses.5
Perhaps not surprisingly, the behavior of real estate prices is the subject of a volu-
minous literature. A substantial body of (mostly empirical) literature tries to estimate
short and long-run macroeconomic determinants of house prices (for a review of recent
contributions, see Girouard et al. [12] and Goodhart and Hofmann [15]). Although many
of these studies di⁄er with respect to the countries and the time period considered, most
of them reach the conclusion that demand-side factors such as income, interest rates, and
demographic factors related to household formation play a key role for the dynamics of
5Our paper shows that easing the ￿scal burden through lower bequest taxation might make real estate
less a⁄ordable. Kopczuk [18] already pointed out that the normative analysis of the inheritance tax is
very sensitive to what is assumed regarding the motivation of bequest. In our contribution we do not
make any normative claim about the optimal level of bequest taxation. Rather, we put forward a positive
investigation that can be generalized to all assets used to make inter-generational transfers. In particular,
we believe that it is important to focus on real estate which, besides being the most commonly used asset
when inter-generational transfers are involved, also represents a sizeable share of optimal portfolio strategy
and a central element of any ￿nancial crisis (as documented for instance in Fugazza et al. [11] and Pelizzon
and Weber [23]).
4house prices. In a set of interesting applications, the ￿tted values from regressions are
then related to the fundamental price which is compared to the actual price to discuss the
presence of real estate bubbles as in Mc Carthy and Peach [22], and Terrones [27] (with
aggregate data), and Abraham and Hendershott [1], Case and Shiller [7], Himmelberg et
al. [21], and Smith and Smith [26] (with regional and city-level data). In a series of papers,
Glaeser et al. [13], [14] highlighted the role of regulatory barriers to new constructions
and land use restrictions as supply-side factors that can help to explain the rise of house
prices in the US.
The role of ￿scal policy and real estate taxation in a⁄ecting house prices has been
analyzed by Bruce and Holtz-Eakin [5] and Hendershott and Price [20], who followed the
seminal contributions by Poterba [24], [25]. In a recent important contribution Cagetti and
De Nardi [6] provide a general account of the welfare implications of abolishing bequest
taxation and how they depend on the compensating tax instrument. This approach is
still subject though to the limitations in the welfare analysis highlighted by Kopczuk [18]:
the speci￿c type of bequest motive assumed a⁄ects the welfare implications of bequest
taxation. However, none of these contributions address the issue that we raise in this
paper: the e⁄ect of bequest taxation on the most important of long lived assets, i.e. real
estate.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and the market
equilibrium. Section 3 discusses the properties of the equilibrium and the relationship
between bequest taxation and real estate prices. Section 4 presents the empirical evidence
while Section 5 concludes.
2 The Economy: Set Up
We present our analysis in the context of a production economy with overlapping gener-
ations living for two periods. We de￿ne generation t to be the set of individuals of unit
measure, endowed with one unit of labor, Lt. Generation t is born at the beginning of
period t and leaves the economy at the end of period t+1. Every generation consumes one
non-durable good in each period of life: c1t units when young and c2t units when old. In
addition to these goods, each generation chooses when young how much (durable) housing
services, Ht, to enjoy during her lifetime. Generation t utility function ￿t is de￿ned as
5follows:
￿t = Ut + ￿Ut+1
Ut = u(c1t) + u(c2t) + v(Ht)
u0; v0 > 0; u00; v00 < 0
0 < ￿ ￿ 1
(1)
where u(￿) and v(￿) denote the utility derived from consumption of non-durable goods and
housing services respectively, and ￿ labels inter-generational altruism.6 In maximizing (1),
generation t faces two budget constraints:






+ (1 ￿ ￿)Dt￿1 ￿ iH
t (2)
c2t = stRt+1 + pt+1Hsale
t ￿ Dt (3)
where wt represents labor income, st savings, Rt+1 the interest factor (one plus the interest
rate) on savings at t + 1, pt the housing price in the private market, Hdon
t￿1 the amount
of housing services that generation t receives from generation t ￿ 1; Hmkt
t the amount
of housing purchased by generation t in period t, Hsale
t the amount of housing sold by
generation t when old in period t+1, iH
t is generation t investment in housing and Dt the
amount of consumption good donated by generation t to generation t + 1 in period t + 1
(which we call ￿money￿ ).
The government levies a bequest tax on any type of inter-generational donation. There-
fore, transfer of housing and ￿money￿between generations is charged a proportional tax of
0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1.7 We will assume that the revenue of the bequest tax raised by the government
- indeed quite small in reality - is used to ￿nance public consumption, without a⁄ecting
the utility derived from private consumption.8
Although the interpretation may seem completely standard, the reader should notice
how equation (2) is set up. Hmkt
t represents the actual net amount of housing that
generation t acquires through inter-generational transfers and private markets in period
6The additive form of ￿t and Ut allows us to get a closed form solution of the model but is not essential
to our results. In fact, any preferences￿structure a la Barro [2] where a generation utility is an increasing
and monotonic function of the entire next generation utility would replicate our qualitative results.
7Bequest is taxed in the same way no matter what its form is (housing or ￿money￿ ). This feature is
common to developed ￿scal system and applies in particular to the Italian case whose evidence we will
study.
8This assumption is introduced only for the sake of simplicity. In fact, our main results might be a⁄ected
only if the largest share of the tax revenue were transferred to the elder generations, which is unlikely to
be the case in practice.






t represents the supply of newly produced housing services as a function of
generation t investment in housing, iH
t .
The interpretation of equation (4) is that consumption of housing services by generation
t can not exceed the sum of what is purchased in private markets and what is independently
built. Moreover generation t is subject to:
Hsale
t + Hdon
t ￿ Ht(1 ￿ ￿) (5)
where ￿ represents the depreciation of housing services consumed by generation t. The
intuition for (5) is that, when generation t becomes old, it must decide how to allocate
its depreciated stock of housing services, Ht(1 ￿ ￿), in period t + 1 between donation to
generation t + 1 and resale in private markets.
The economy is endowed with two production functions. The ￿rst one produces housing




f0 > 0; f00 < 0
We assume that housing produced by one generation becomes part of housing consumption
of that same generation.
The production function of the non-durable good displays constant returns of scale in
capital, Kt; and labor, Lt; and satis￿es the law of diminishing returns to single factors:
Yt = G(Kt;Lt)
GK > 0; GL > 0
GKK < 0; GLL < 0
(6)
Capital is created at no cost from period t consumption good and is employed to produce
t + 1 non durable consumption good. Without loss of generality, capital fully depreciates
from one period to the next and so capital accumulation follows:
Kt+1 = It (7)
9Equivalently we could assume that housing displays constant returns to scale and employs both capital
and labor (in ￿xed supply in the economy).
7It is convenient to express aggregate production in (t-generation) per capita terms exploit-
ing constant returns to scale assumption and the fact that Lt = 1, 8t:
yt = g(kt)
g0 > 0; g00 < 0
where yt and kt are output and capital in period t expressed in per capita terms. Thus
the law of motion of the economy (7) can be rewritten in per capita terms as:
kt+1 = it (8)
where the level of capital per capita in period t + 1; kt+1, is a function of investment per
capita in period t, it.
2.1 Market Equilibrium
De￿nition 1 (Market equilibrium) The market equilibrium is a choice vector (c1t; c2t;
it; iH
t ; Ht; Hsale
t ; Hdon
t ; Hmkt










s.t. (2), (3), (4), (5); 8t
(ii) The goods￿market clears:
c1t + c2t￿1 + iH








represents the tax revenues raised by the government, in order to ￿nance public con-
sumption.





We can exploit the conditions above to ￿nd the two dynamic equations that describe
the evolution of the housing stock and the capital stock of the economy. First, we observe




















which means that the stock of housing for generation t; Ht; is the sum of what was resold on
the market by generation t￿1, Hsale
t￿1 , what was inherited by generation t from generation
t ￿ 1; Hdon






Equation (12) fully describes the dynamics of the housing stock of the economy.
Second, by (9), we have:
c1t + iH
t + Tt + it = g(kt) ￿ c2t￿1 (13)
Using equation (3), it yields:
st￿1Rt = g(kt) ￿ wt = c2t￿1 + Dt￿1 ￿ ptHsale
t￿1
so that equation (13) becomes:
it = wt + Dt￿1 ￿ ptHsale
t￿1 ￿ c1t ￿ iH
t ￿ Tt
and, substituting for (8), (10), we ￿nd:







and by (2) and (11)
kt+1 = st (14)
where future capital stock is equal to current private savings since there is full depreciation
of capital. This completes the description of the dynamic evolution of the aggregate
variables of the economy.10
3 The Equilibrium Price of Real Estate
Solving the maximization problem for generation t and substituting the FOCs with respect
to Hmkt
t and Hsale
t into the FOC with respect to Ht we obtain:
v0(Ht) = ptu0(c1t) ￿ pt+1u0(c2t)(1 ￿ ￿) (15)
10The assumption that capital fully depreciates has no e⁄ect on the qualitative implications of our
analysis.If we relaxed this assumption, the old would end up selling and/or donating it to the young as
they will do with the stock of housing. The same implications that our analysis draws for housing could
then be extended to capital, but they would still hold.
9This equation has a very simple interpretation: it states that generation t equalizes the
marginal bene￿t of consuming an additional unit of housing to its marginal cost measured
by the di⁄erence between the utility weighted cost of purchasing housing - ptu0(c1t) - and
the utility weighted bene￿t of reselling it when old, net of depreciation - pt+1u0(c2t)(1￿￿).
A similar equation may be derived with respect to the optimal amount of donation,
substituting the FOC with respect to Hdon
t into the FOC with respect to Ht:
v0(Ht) = ptu0(c1t) ￿ pt+1(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ ￿ u0(c1t+1)(1 ￿ ￿) (16)
Equation (16) can be interpreted as the equality between the marginal bene￿t of con-
suming an additional unit of housing and the marginal cost measured by the di⁄erence
between the utility weighted cost of purchasing housing - [ptu0(c1t)] - and the utility
weighted bene￿t of donating it to generation t + 1 net of taxation and depreciation -
[(1 ￿ ￿)￿ ￿ pt+1u0(c1t+1)(1 ￿ ￿)].
Joining (15) and (16), it is easy to observe that, in equilibrium, each old generation
will choose consumption and the level of donation so that its marginal utility equates the
marginal utility of consumption of the following generation, accounting for the degree of
inter-generational altruism (￿) and bequest taxation (￿):
u0(c2t) = (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ ￿ u0(c1t+1): (17)
Equation (17) shows that generation t may ￿nd it optimal to decrease its consumption
when old allowing for larger inter-generational transfers. Moreover, comparing equation
(17) with the FOC with respect to st,




= (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ ￿ Rt+1: (19)
Equation (19) is interesting because it helps understanding the dynamic behavior of the
economy. Since Rt+1 > 1 and (1 ￿ ￿)￿ 6 1, the right-hand side could be larger, equal
or smaller than one. If [(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ ￿ Rt+1] > 1, this would imply that consumption when
young increases from one generation to the next. Vice-versa, if [(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ ￿ Rt+1] < 1
then it would decrease from one generation to the following one. In order to fully exploit
equation (19), we de￿ne the steady state of the economy:
10De￿nition 2 (Steady state) The steady state of the economy is de￿ned by constant
allocations across generations:
c1t = c1t+1 = c1;8t
c2t = c2t+1 = c2;8t
Ht = H;8t
Given our stationary environment, we can safely focus on the stationary steady state of
the economy. Since Rt+1 is an endogenous price - the relative price of consumption when
young over consumption when old -, in the steady state it must adjust so that
u0(c1t)
u0(c1t+1) = 1.
By (19) and (18), we have:
R =
1
(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿
(20)









and so, by (20):
p =
v0(H)
u0(c1)[1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)]
(22)
which is the same expression that we could have derived using equation (16). The resulting
steady state real estate price, p, can be used - joining FOCs with respect to iH
t and Hmkt
t





To fully characterize the steady-state real estate price, we can state the following
proposition:
Proposition 1 (Housing price) In steady state, the price of housing, p:
1. increases as the tax rate on bequests, ￿, decreases;
2. increases as housing depreciation, ￿, decreases;
3. increases as the level of inter-generational altruism, ￿, increases if the substitution
e⁄ect (weakly) dominates the income e⁄ect.
11Proof. See Appendix for proof of (2) and (3).
Here we ￿nd it worthwhile to illustrate the simple proof for (1). In the case of a decrease
in ￿, one needs to consider its e⁄ect on the interest rate. First, by (20), a decrease in ￿
decreases the real interest rate R in steady state. If the substitution e⁄ect dominates the
income e⁄ect, a decrease in the real interest rate increases young age consumption c1, and






[1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)]
(24)





must increase for (24) to be satis￿ed. Since






contradiction, that only v0(H) decreases but p remains unchanged. This implies that H
increases. But this is only possible, by (12),if iH also increases. Then f0(iH) must decrease
and, by (23), p thus increases in steady state, contradicting the assumption that only v0(H)
decreases.
The main result of Proposition 1 is that lower bequest taxes increase the steady-state
price of housing. The intuition is based on a ￿no arbitrage￿argument. Once it has been
enjoyed by the generation that owns it, housing can be employed in two ways: it can either
be sold on the market at given price p or it can be transferred to the following generation.
In equilibrium, the two uses must yield the same marginal utility, otherwise only one use
- the one delivering more utility - would be observed. As bequest taxation decreases,
the bene￿t of inter-generational transfers increases. Therefore, old agents become more
willing to bequeath and less willing to sell their houses on the market. The increase in
donation and bequest delivers a positive wealth e⁄ect on the young generation that raises
equilibrium prices. The rise in the real estate price, p; continues until the utility that
the old enjoy by selling houses on the market equalizes the one enjoyed by transferring
it to the following generation, net of bequest taxes. Therefore we can state the following
corollary to Proposition 1:
Corollary 1 In steady state, a decrease in the tax rate on bequests, ￿, strictly increases
the total amount of equilibrium donation (Hdon
t + Dt) and, almost surely, the amount of
real estate donation, (Hdon
t ).
The quali￿cation ￿almost surely￿comes from the fact that the increase in donation
resulting from the reduction of the bequest tax may take place in any combination of
12money or real estate. Although it is theoretically conceivable that only money donation
will react to the tax change, this is only one possible allocation in a continuum of equilibria
and it has, therefore, measure zero.11
It is interesting to notice that, while the implications of Proposition 1 and its Corollary
apply quite naturally to real estate, they can be extended to a variety of assets. In fact,
the same observations could be drawn on the price of any ￿nancial asset that exceeds the
life-span of a generation and may thus be used for inter-generational transfers.12
4 Empirical Analysis
In this section we bring our analysis to the data testing the e⁄ect on real estate prices of the
abolition of bequest taxation. We do so by asking the following question: if, as our model
implies, the abolition of the bequest tax has increased, ceteris paribus, the steady-state
level of real estate prices, can we ￿nd in the Italian empirical evidence an acceleration of
real estate appreciation that started in 2001 and is linked to the tax change?
To this end, we use a unique dataset built by combining a variety of sources, two of
which are proprietary (real estate prices and donations) and were not available before. We
focus on (proprietary) prices (per squared meter) of urban residential real estate units in
the 13 major Italian cities over time. These cities together represent slightly more than 15%
of the current Italian population. We combine economic and demographic data about Italy,
European real estate price data and data from the Italian Ministry of the Economy and
Public Finances regarding residential real estate donations. Data have annual frequency
and are disaggregated by city to build a panel dataset covering the period 1993-2004 which
includes the year (2001) when bequest and donation taxation was abolished. All variables
are netted of CPI in￿ ation and should be considered as real (additional information on
11For a study of the transitional dynamics of bequest behavior between the two steady states, we can
refer to Grossmann and Poutvaara [16], who study these in a di⁄erent but very related setup.
12We are aware that additional mechanisms could a⁄ect the behavior of real estate prices. For instance,
if the tax rate on bequests, ￿, is su¢ ciently steep, it may tend to depress real estate prices because of
forced sales to pay taxes within a short period of time after death. Moreover, after the abolition of bequest
taxation, there could be a smaller number of houses availabe in the market, especially if the recipient
chooses to over-consume housing services because of the bequest. Finally, if we extended our analysis to
the case of heterogenous houses, we might ￿nd a particularly large increase of prices for homes in desirable
neighborhoods where they are more likely to be bequeathed from one generation to the next one. These
mechanisms, if anything, would actually reinforce our main prediction that a decrease in bequest taxation
induces an increase in real estate prices. This is the reason why we chose to simplify the analysis and not
incorporate them in the model.
13the dataset are available in the Data Description in the Appendix).
We test the main predictions of this paper about the relationship between taxation of
bequests and inter vivos donations and real estate prices, as stated in Proposition 1 and
its Corollary. Although these propositions predict a discrete increase in the price level
of housing once bequest taxation is abolished, in our empirical strategy we test whether
there was an acceleration in the rate of growth of real estate prices after the tax change.
This seems a natural strategy in order to bring our stylized model to the data. In fact,
prices are likely to take some time to reach the new equilibrium in the residential real
estate market, where several frictions exist.
Since our dataset covers slightly more than a decade and inter vivos donations react
much faster than bequests but are taxed in the same way, we will focus on the former
to show the e⁄ect of this kind of taxation on real estate prices. As we already discussed,
the main prediction of the theory that we put forward is that the abolition of bequest
and donation taxation brought about an increase in real estate prices. We start by the
preliminary test:
￿pit = ￿i + ￿ ￿ time + ￿ ￿ Tax + "it
where the dependent variable ￿pit represents the real growth rate in the price of residential
housing (per squared-meter) in city i between year t and t￿1; ￿i are time-invariant city-
level ￿xed e⁄ects, time is the time trend and Tax is a time dummy taking value 1 in all
years when bequest and donation taxation was abolished (year ￿ 2001).
Table 2 suggests that there was an acceleration in real estate appreciation that started
from 2001, the year when bequest and donation taxation was abolished. Although the
abolition of bequest taxation included little more than two months in 2001, the evidence
supports the view that its e⁄ect was far from negligible as the increase in the number of
bequests was in excess of 100% (see Figure 2). This is most likely due to the fact that the
government elected in 2001 made it very clear that it would have abolished bequest and
donation taxation and, therefore, individuals most likely postponed their donations to the
last part of 2001.13
According to our theoretical analysis, the e⁄ect of the abolition of bequest taxation
is channeled to real estate prices via the surge in the number of donations. Speci￿cally,
13It is also quite unlikely that this policy change simply legalized donations that were previously hidden
through cash transfers after housing sales. The reason is two-fold. First, the increase in the number of
donations is so large that it seems unlikely that the government would have allowed so much tax evasion that
was so easy to discover given traceability of ￿nancial transactions. Second, if one argues that individuals
could easily evade bequest taxation, it is very puzzling that, before the tax abolition, 1/3 of all residential
units transacted in Italy was in fact donated.
14our model predicts that, ceteris paribus, the rise in donations is one of the reasons for the
acceleration in real estate price growth that started in 2001. This prediction is going to be
investigated in the remaining of this section. The general equilibrium analysis in Section
3 provides guidance in the empirical strategy to study the e⁄ect of bequest tax on the rate
of growth of real estate prices.14 When bequest taxation is abolished, agents reallocate
a sizeable share of their housing stock towards donations and bequests. The size of this
reallocation in turn a⁄ects the extent of real estate appreciation.
A preview of our empirical strategy is as follows. We use a two-stage estimation
strategy in our panel (￿xed e⁄ect) regression. In the ￿rst stage, we regress the number
of donations, market sales and the level of real estate investment on a set of instruments,
including the Tax dummy (Tax); and additional controls. In the second stage, we use our
estimates to assess the e⁄ect of each of these three factors on real estate prices. Formally,
we want to estimate:
￿pit = ￿i + ￿D ￿ Hdon
it + ￿S ￿ Hsale
it + ￿I ￿ ￿iH
t =Yt + ￿ ￿ (Controls)it + uit (25)
where, following Proposition 1 and its Corollary, ￿pit is determined by the number of
donations, Hdon
it , and market sales, Hsale
it , per 100 inhabitants taking place in city i and
year t and involving residential real estate units only, and by ￿iH
t =Yt; the national growth
rate of physical investment in residential real estate (over GDP) between year t and t￿1.
Endogeneity is clearly the main problem of this speci￿cation, since the number of sales
and donations and the level of investment are likely to respond to residential real estate




t =Yt, by the following set of exogenous demographic and macroeconomic
variables: rt is the (national level) average interest rate on house mortgages in year t,
￿wit is the growth rate of per capita employees￿compensation in city i between year t
and t￿1, ￿(Res < 25=Res > 65)it, the change in the ratio of under 25 resident and over
65 resident in city i between year t and t ￿ 1, and (obviously) Tax.15
There are good reasons to believe these instruments are exogenous and not weak. First,
rt is the average borrowing interest rate on house mortgages in Italy in year t: it depends
(very closely) on exogenous monetary policy and is unlikely to have an e⁄ect on real
estate price growth that does not go through sales, donations and investment. Moreover,
the inclusion of this variable also allows to capture the e⁄ect of the introduction of the euro
14See the discussion after Proposition 1.
15Notice that the rate rt - a borrowing rate - is not the same as Rt in the model of Sections 2 and 3. Rt
represents the rate of return of investing in assets di⁄erent from real estate. In fact, Rt in our empirical
strategy is represented by the annual return on the stock market, R
equity
t .
15in Italy. The mortgage interest rate is an especially good instrument as home equity is
unavailable and the liberalization of mortgage re￿nancing took place only after the period
under scrutiny. Therefore, a reduction in the interest rate on mortgages is likely to a⁄ect
real estate prices only if individuals take advantage of it by purchasing (Hsale
it ) or building
(￿iH
t =Yt) additional real estate. ￿wit depends on productivity and bargaining dynamics.
The change in the number of young over old residents, ￿(Res < 25=Res > 65)it, is also
likely to be exogenous. Both salary and demographic dynamics seem to a⁄ect real estate
prices only insofar as they a⁄ect market exchanges and investment in the housing market.
Finally, the time dummy Tax depends on exogenous tax decisions and its e⁄ect on real
estate prices, as the model argues, is channeled through the number of donations (Hdon
it ).
We will focus on this last instrument, which is crucial to test the implication of this study.
We also introduce the relevant additional controls such as R
equity
t , the Italian stock mar-
ket (cum dividend) real annual return between year t and year t￿1, (NetCapInflow=Y )t,
capital in￿ ows (net of the change in international reserves) over GDP in year t and ￿Popit;
the population growth rate in city i between year t and t ￿ 1. The inclusion of net capi-
tal in￿ ows, (NetCapInflow=Y )t, from the ￿nancial account of the balance of payments
deserves a speci￿c comment. Between November 1st, 2001 and February 28th, 2002 the
Italian government provided a tax shield which allowed all funds held abroad by Italian
residents to re-enter the country under a very favorable tax treatment. Since these in￿ ows
may have had an e⁄ect on real estate appreciation, it is important to include net capital
in￿ ows among the set of control variables in our regression.16
Tables 3a and 3b show the results of our empirical analysis. Consistently with our
theory, the ￿rst stage of the regression displayed in Table 3a shows that the abolition of
bequest and donation taxation had a positive and signi￿cant e⁄ect on the number of dona-
tions but negative on the number of real estate sales. As intergenerational transfers made
through donations become cheaper (i.e. less taxed), agents reallocate their housing stock
away from the market and toward donations. All remaining coe¢ cients have an intuitive
interpretation: the real interest rate on mortgages - an indicator of credit availability -
has a negative e⁄ect on both investment in the real estate sector and the number of mar-
ket transactions; a relatively younger population, i.e. a larger ￿(Res < 25=Res > 65);
increases market transactions and decreases the number of donations; an increase in labor
income, ￿wit(percapita), increases market transactions but decreases the number of do-
nations as would be expected in the case of rationally altruistic agents, capital in￿ ows and
population growth have a positive e⁄ect on the level of real estate investment, while they
16City dummies are also included in the estimation although their coe¢ cients are omitted in the tables.
16had no statistically signi￿cant e⁄ect of market transactions and donations. The F-tests
on the ￿rst stage lean toward the view that the chosen instruments are not weak.
Tables 3b displays the second stage of the regression and shows that the number of
donations has a statistically signi￿cant e⁄ect on real estate price growth. Two main
remarks are worthwhile mentioning here. First, not surprisingly, we ￿nd that demand
(Hsale
it and Hdon
it ) and supply (￿iH
t =Yt) factors have a statistically signi￿cant e⁄ect on
the dynamics of residential real estate prices. Second, donations (which are typically
between 5% and 80% of the number of market transactions in our dataset, depending on
the city and year) have a particularly strong e⁄ect on real estate price growth, especially
if compared with market transactions. We ￿nd that, on average, if 1 more resident every
100 in a given city and year receives a donation of a unit of residential real estate - indeed
a very large increase -, the market price would rise by roughly 20%.
Although we consider regressing the change in real estate prices on the yearly ￿ ows of
residential real estate donations and market transactions as the most accurate test of our
model, our empirical results turn out to be robust to the possibility that the growth of real
estate prices responds to the change in the number of donations and market transactions
and not to their annual ￿ ows. Speci￿cally, we regress a slightly modi￿ed version of (25):
￿pit = ￿i + ￿ ￿ (￿Hdon
it ￿ ￿Hsale
it ) + ￿I ￿ ￿iH
t =Yt + ￿ ￿ (Controls)it + uit (26)
where instead of the the number of donations, Hdon
it , and market sales, Hsale
it , we introduce
as explanatory variable the di⁄erence between the change in the number of donations and
market transactions, (￿Hdon
it ￿ ￿Hsale
it ). Consistently with our theory, we ￿nd that real
estate price tend to increase when donations grow faster than market transactions. We
address the endogeneity of regressor (￿Hdon
it ￿ ￿Hsale
it ); as in the case of regression (25),
by instrumenting (￿Hdon
it ￿￿Hsale
it ) with the real interest rate, rt;the change in proportion
of young relative to old people in given year and city, ￿(Res < 25=Res > 65)it, and the
￿bequest tax￿time dummy, Tax. The reader can refer to the beginning of this section for
a discussion of why we believe that these are appropriate instruments. First and second
stages are reported in Table 4a and 4b in the appendix.
It could be argued that the abolition of bequest taxation had a statistically insigni￿cant
e⁄ect on the price dynamics of newly built residential units, since the units being donated
are typically ￿used￿ , i.e. pre-existing units. To this end, we replicate the empirical exercise
considered in (25) using as dependent variable the real growth in the price of ￿newly built￿
residential real estate in the di⁄erent cities of the sample, ￿pNEW
it . Results are reported
in Table 5 and turn out to be in line with those of Table 3b. This is not surprising since, in
17equilibrium, the price of new and ￿used￿real estate units must move in the same direction:
the di⁄erence in their prices can only be a premium (in the levels) due to the di⁄erent
qualities of the same asset (real estate).
We conduct two additional checks of the robustness of our results. First, we address
the concern that our central instrument, i.e. the Tax dummy variable, is capturing some
other time e⁄ect that was present before and is not related to the abolition of bequest
taxation. We do so by repeating the exercise in (25) but introducing di⁄erent "placebo"
time dummies taking value equal to one starting from years before and after 2001. The
second stage R-squares reported in Table 6 show that the time dummy capturing the
actual tax change, i.e. Tax, provides a better (or comparable) ￿t than the two alternative
￿placebo￿ .
Second, since we are unable to apply a di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence analysis because the
abolition of bequest and donation taxation was introduced in all Italian cities and regions
at the same time, we address the concern that our regression is capturing some general,
Europe-wide or time trend toward real estate appreciation. If this were the case, the
signi￿cance of our Tax dummy variable could be a result of this sector or time speci￿c
e⁄ect only. We thus perform the same empirical estimation of equation (25) but we add
the real growth rate in real estate prices in EU-1517, ￿pt ￿ EU15; as control variable. If
there was just a time trend e⁄ect, ￿pt ￿ EU15 would be likely to absorb it as real estate
prices in Europe has been growing continuously during the time span of our analysis. The
two stages of this enriched regression are displayed in Tables 7a and 7b. This would make
the Tax dummy not signi￿cant in the ￿rst stage (Table 7a) and take away the signi￿cance
of Hdon
it in the second stage (Table 7b) or, at least, reduce their e⁄ects substantially. As
it can be checked by comparing the two set of estimates (Tables 3a and 3b and Tables 7a
and 7b), almost no di⁄erence in the point estimates emerges. Moreover, both Tax and
Hdon
it remain statistically signi￿cant, even after the introduction of the additional control
￿pt￿EU15. This is reassuring as it makes hard to claim that our results are just capturing
a time trend e⁄ect.
Moreover, we report in Figure 4 the average (cross-city) residuals of regression (25)
including and excluding ￿pt￿EU15: It is interesting to notice that the additional variable
does not seem to improve the ￿t of the model in the years around the abolition of bequest
taxation. This is particularly important because, as real estate appreciation started in
1999 in Italy, one could be concerned that our Tax dummy is only capturing an underlying
European trend toward real estate appreciation. This does not seem to be case as Tax
17Source: Eurostat. Data are available only starting from 1997.
18retains its explanatory power even after the introduction of ￿pt ￿ EU15:
We ￿nally employ the constructed dataset and the estimates of (25) to provide a
possible evaluation of the city-level e⁄ect of the abolition of bequest and donation taxation.
This can be done by exploiting the fact that di⁄erent cities displayed di⁄erent reactions
in terms of market transactions and donations to the abolition of bequest and donation
taxation at the national level. To estimate the real estate price appreciation due to the
tax change alone, we compute the change in prices predicted by the change in the three
instrumented variables due to the policy shock. Formally:
c ￿pi2001Tax Change = c ￿D





















where ￿2001Xit = Xi2001￿Xi2000, i.e. the change in variable X at city level between
year 2001 and 2000, c ￿j
IV ; j = D;S;I are second stage coe¢ cients estimated in equation
(25) and b ￿
j
TAX; j = D;S;I; are the ￿rst stage estimates for the coe¢ cients of the tax
dummy, Tax, on the three instrumented variables. The city level estimates are above
10% supporting the claim that changes in bequest and donation taxation have important
e⁄ects on the prices of assets used to make inter-generational transfers. All results are
reported in Table 8.
5 Conclusions
This paper develops a theoretical and empirical investigation of the relationship between
the ￿scal treatment of bequests and inter vivos donations and the price dynamics of long-
lasting assets in general and real estate in particular.
From a theoretical point of view, we show that, in a general equilibrium perspective,
changes in the level of taxation on bequests and donations a⁄ect real estate prices. To put
it shortly, as the market equilibrium for real estate is characterized by the coexistence of
donations and resales of houses, it must be the case that the marginal agent is indi⁄erent
between donation and resale of housing. When taxes on bequest and donations are lowered,
two e⁄ects take place. First, the marginal bene￿t of donating increases so that the amount
of donations increases (direct e⁄ect). Second, as more and more people donate their
housing stock, the market price of residential real estate increases until a new equilibrium
is reached where the marginal utilities of resales and donations are equalized (general
equilibrium e⁄ect).
19From an empirical point of view, we test our theoretical predictions by exploiting a
unique policy shock (i.e. the abolition of bequest and donation taxation which took place
in Italy in 2001) through an original dataset on real estate sales, donations and prices at
city level. By focusing on such rare policy change, this is to the best of our knowledge the
￿rst paper in the literature to document the e⁄ect of bequest and donation taxation on real
estate prices. In particular, we ￿nd strong supporting empirical evidence that the abolition
of taxation on bequests and donations had a signi￿cant and sizeable positive e⁄ect on real
estate prices, on top of what can be explained by macroeconomic and demographic factors.
This result is robust to a set of di⁄erent speci￿cations.
Real estate had a central role in the current global ￿nancial crisis and we should pay
special attention to any ￿scal and tax policy that may a⁄ect its price, especially when this
e⁄ect is the result of an unexpected general equilibrium mechanism and it is sizeable, as
this study of the Italian case suggests. After all, real estate may still remain ￿the root of
all evil￿in future ￿nancial and economic crises.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Agents￿optimization
The solution to the problem in section 2 is equivalent to the maximization of the following
Lagrangian function, L:
L = Ut + ￿Ut+1 + ￿((1 ￿ ￿)Ht ￿ Hsale
t ￿ Hdon
t ) + ￿(Hmkt
t + f(iH
t ) ￿ Ht)
where ￿ and ￿ represent the multipliers on constraints (5) and (4) respectively. We
substitute c1t and c2t according to (2) and (3). The relevant ￿rst order conditions are:
u0(c1t) = Rt+1u0(c2t) (st)
v0(Ht) = ￿ ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿) (Ht)
ptu0(c1t) = ￿ (Hmkt
t )
pt+1u0(c2t) = ￿ (Hsale
t )
22(1 ￿ ￿)pt+1 ￿ ￿u0(c1t+1) = ￿ (Hdon
t )
(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿u0(c1t+1) = u0(c2t) (Dt)
￿f 0(iH
t ) = u0(c1t) (iH
t )
6.2 Proof of Proposition 1
(2). Assume that ￿ increases. Then, by (22):
p >
v0(H)
u0(c1)[1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)]
and nobody would buy housing since the marginal cost is higher than the marginal bene￿t.
But then p must fall and so, by (23), iH also decreases. Thus, by (12), H decreases while,
by (2), c1 (weakly) increases delivering a new housing price p below the original one.
(3). By (20), an increase in ￿ decreases r. If the substitution e⁄ect dominates the






must increase for (22) to be satis￿ed. Since u0(c1) decreases,
something else must adjust. Assume, by contradiction, that v0(H) decreases alone. This
implies that H increases. But this is only possible, by (12), if iH also increases. Then, by
(23), f0(iH) decreases and p must increase, contradicting the initial assumption.
236.3 Tables and Figures
Bequest and Inter-Vivos Donation Taxation in Italy
Tax Base Exemption Tax
Law 346/1990 Total Total Estate Brackets Rate (%)
Bequest Tax (BT) Donor Estate ￿ 125K Euro 125K-175K 3
175K-250K 7
Higher tax 250K-400K 10
on non relative 400K-750K 15
recipients 750K-1500K 22
>1500K 27
Law 342/2000 Estate Received Individual Spouse 4%
Exemption by Each Recipient Share Estate Direct Relatives 4%







































(NetCapInflow=Y )t 1.032** 0.026 -0.001
(0:063) (0:024) (0.008)




t -0.025** -0.0007 0.0001
(0:003) (0:00008) (0.0002)
Observations 156 156 156
R-squared 0.88 0.93 0.92
F-test: All Inst￿ s ￿ = 0 765.83 21.84 58.24




























* signi￿cant at 5% ** signi￿cant at 1%
Anderson Test
























￿wit(per capita) -0.009 -1.226
(0:03) (1:786)










F-test: All Inst￿ s ￿ = 0 633.12 13.68
SE in parentheses
* signi￿cant at 5%


































* signi￿cant at 5% ** signi￿cant at 1%
Anderson Test































* signi￿cant at 5% ** signi￿cant at 1%
Anderson Test







R-squared - 2nd stage
Pseudo ￿ Tax


































(NetCapInflow=Y )t 0.290** 0.029 0.012
(0.002) (0.028) (0.014)




t -0.001** -0.003* -0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
￿pt ￿ EU15 0.874** -0.018 -0.038*
(0.003) (0.029) (0.015)
Observations 104 104 104
R-squared 0.99 0.95 0.97
F-test: All Inst￿ s ￿ = 0 252:3 875.26 394.95






























* signi￿cant at 5% ** signi￿cant at 1%
Anderson Test














Bari 16.6 Napoli 14.7
Bologna 14.3 Padova 16.3
Cagliari 16.6 Palermo 14.3
Catania 15.3 Roma 13.9
Firenze 14.4 Torino 14.3
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it are the annual real growth rate in, respectively, not renovated and
renovated/new urban residential real estate prices (per squared meter) in the 13 major
Italian cities (Source: Nomisma Real Estate, proprietary data)
Hdon
it is the number of donations per 100 inhabitants taking place in city i and year t
in residential real estate units (Source: ISTAT - Italian National Institute of Statistics -
and Italian Ministry of Economics)
Hsale
it is the number of market sales per 100 inhabitants taking place in city i and year
t and involving residential real estate units (Source: Nomisma Real Estate, proprietary
data)
EU15￿pt is the annual real growth rate in real estate prices in the ￿rst 15 countries
of the European Union (Source: Eurostat)
￿iH
t =Yt is the national growth rate of physical investment in residential real estate
(over GDP) between year t and t ￿ 1 (Source: ISTAT)
rt is the (national level) average interest rate on house mortgages in year t (Source:
Bank of Italy)
￿wit is the growth rate of per capita employees￿compensation in city i between year
t and t ￿ 1 (Source: ISTAT)
￿(Res < 25=Res > 65)it is the change in the ratio of under 25 resident and over 65
resident in city i between year t and t ￿ 1 (Source: ISTAT)
R
equity
t is the stock market (cum dividend) real annual return between year t and year
t ￿ 1 (Source: Research Department, Mediobanca)
(NetCapInflow=Y )t is the net capital in￿ ow (net of the change in international re-
serves) over GDP in year t (Source: National Accounts, Bank of Italy)
￿Popit is the population growth rate in city i between year t and t￿1 (Source: ISTAT)
37Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
r 4.59 2.488 1.35 8.122 156
Delta(Res<25/Res>65) -3.619 1.092 -5.571 0.144 156
Delta(w) 0.151 1.599 -4.05 5.520 156
NetCapIn￿ ow/Y -0.189 0.938 -1.632 1.402 156
DeltaPop -0.724 1.205 -10.895 4.25 156
R(equity) 14.198 24.545 -24.23 54.353 156
mkt100ab 1.299 0.768 0.223 3.395 156
don100ab 0.318 0.217 0.038 1.071 156
Delta(don100ab) - Delta(mkt100ab) 7.168 57.606 -75.589 320.345 156
Delta(i)/Y 0.15 1.961 -2.6 3.8 156
Delta(pNEW) 0.253 6.927 -17.745 15.732 156
Delta(p) 0.271 6.919 -15.072 15.147 156
38